New ‘Mind & Cognitive Science’ Editor for Philosophy Compass

We’re delighted to announce the appointment of the new editor of the Mind & Cognitive Science section of Philosophy Compass, Michelle Montague, taking over from Tim Bayne. A hearty welcome to Michelle and our thanks to Tim for his sterling work!

Michelle is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas, Austin and a Senior Lecturer at the University of Bristol, UK.  Her primary interests are philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and metaphysics; recent publications include “The phenomenology of particularity” (2011) in T. Bayne and M. Montague (eds) Cognitive Phenomenology; “Recent work on Intentionality” (2011) in Analysis; “The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion” (2009) in Philosophical Studies; and“Against Propositionalism” (2007) in Nous. She is currently working on a book on mental content, with particular reference to the relationship between intentionality and phenomenology.

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Kit Fine on ‘Truth Making’

In 2011, dialectica held its 2011 annual lecture at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division conference.

The lecture was given by Kit Fine, who is arguably the most important living philosopher, on the topic of ‘Truth Making’. A podcast of Kit Fine’s lecture is available for free below:

New Philosophy Spotlight App!

Philosophy Spotlight is a free must-have app for philosophers brought to you by Wiley. This exciting new app gives you the following community features at your fingertips, anywhere, anytime –

• Latest information on key conferences and latest conference tweets
• A free, comprehensive Frommer’s travel guide to major conference locations
• Latest abstracts for articles and books, including the ability to ‘follow’ your favorite publications
• Latest free Sample Issues for key journals
• Latest Special Issues, including free articles
• Access to video and audio podcasts
• Latest posts from key blogs
• Access to a series of Publishing Workshops, in audio and PDF format
• Access to the Wiley-Blackwell Social Sciences & Humanities Facebook page
• Links to key societies
• Customizable Syllabi Search tool to find syllabi freely available on institutional websites, perfect for generating teaching ideas
• Customizable YouTube search tool to find educational videos
• Customizable search tools for Wiley Online Library
• The ability to bookmark any content you see, email yourself a Reading List and share content via Facebook and Twitter
• The ability to add your own RSS feeds, allowing you to keep track of your favorite sources

Find out more and download for free.

dialectica Essay Prize – Cognitive Penetration

The dialectica 2012 essay prize topic has been announced! Submit your article on the topic of Cognitive Penetration before November 1st for your chance to win £1,500!

Cognitive penetration refers to the influence of beliefs, expectations, moods, desires or background theories on the content of perceptual processes or conscious experiences. This phenomenon has been in the forefront of the philosophy of science, the philosophy of perception, and the foundations of cognitive science. Philosophers of science have warned that cognitive penetration might threaten the epistemic role of perception as an objective source of knowledge and have used it to explain radical paradigm shifts. Philosophers of perception have tried to characterize the various ways in which perceptual processes or conscious experiences can be altered by other mental states or activities. Cognitive scientists have exploited this phenomenon as a starting point to motivate claims on the architecture of the human mind, including modularity and plasticity.

We invite submissions on any aspect of this phenomenon. Possible questions include: How is the influence of various mental states on perceptual processes or experiences to be characterized in psychological terms? Are there principled differences between the cognitive penetration of conscious experiences and that of subpersonal perceptual processes? What is the impact (if any) of cognitive penetration on the individuation of mental states? What kinds of cognitive penetration are there? Does cognitive penetration lend support to relativism? How does cognitive penetration relate to the confirmation of scientific theories by experience? Does cognitive penetration undermine (or support) some models of perceptual justification? Does the use of instruments to observe phenomena presuppose any form of cognitive penetration? What sorts of evidence can support or disconfirm claims about cognitive penetration? Could it shed new light on Kuhnian incommensurability?

Please send your submissions in pdf format to Philipp Keller, philipp.keller@unige.ch, by the 1st of November 2012. The author of the winning entry will receive £1500. All papers submitted will be considered submissions to the journal and should not be published or under review elsewhere.

Virtual Issue on Genetics

This special online issue of the Hastings Center Report brings together disparate discussions of the ethical issues posed by genetic science. In early issues of the Report, in the 1970s, discussions of genetics often sought partly just imply to identify and organize the issues- and to argue, in effect, that this was a topic that bioethics should address. Since then, the discussion has turned to more narrowly drawn issues. In this issue, for example, a set of six essays addresses the prospect that genetic information will lead to an era of “personalized medicine, ” with implications not only for medical treatment but also for cost of care, biobanking, privacy, and access to information, among other things. In the lead article, legal scholar Mark Rothstein considers whether health policy should address genetic information separately from other kinds of medical information, and in an editorial on Rothstein founded in the column titled Another Voice, British philosopher Neil Manson explains why treating genetic information separately seems so attractive. A special supplement to this issue, by Hastings scholar Erik Parens, explores the ramifications of behavioral genetics, and other items branch off in still other directions, including (genuinely going afield here) into the prospect that genetic and other sciences might allow human beings to transcend the human condition. The items selected for this issue emphasize more recent scholarship and commentary, but were otherwise chosen precisely to capture as much as possible of the range of material that has appeared in the Report on this topic.

Click here to read the virtual issue.

Journal of Applied Philosophy 2011 Article Prize Winner

The editors of the Journal of Applied Philosophy are pleased to announce the winner of the 2011 annual article prize. Congratulations to Jakob Elster who was awarded the £1000 prize for his article How Outlandish Can Imaginary Cases Be?

 The Journal of Applied Philosophy will continue to award an annual prize of £1000 to the best article published in the year’s volume. The judgement as to the best article will be made by the editors of the journal; the Society for Applied Philosophy annual lecture, published in the journal, will not be eligible for the prize of best article.

 

New Naturalistic Philosophy Editor for Philosophy Compass

We’re delighted to announce the appointment of the new editor of the Naturalistic Philosophy section of Philosophy Compass, Edouard Machery.

Edouard is Associate Professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, a Fellow of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, and a member of the Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition (Pittsburgh-CMU). His research focuses on the philosophical issues raised by psychology and cognitive neuroscience with a special interest in concepts, moral psychology, the relevance of evolutionary biology for understanding cognition, modularity, the nature, origins, and ethical significance of prejudiced cognition, and the methods of psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He has published more than 60 articles and chapters on these topics in venues such as Analysis, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Cognition, Mind & Language, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and Philosophy of Science. He is the author of Doing without Concepts (OUP, 2009), and he has been an associate editor of The European Journal for Philosophy of Science since 2009. He is also involved in the development of experimental philosophy, having published several noted articles in this field.